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Abstract
Mechanisms where sellers set the price and are charged a linear commission fee
are widely used by real world intermediaries, e.g. by real estate brokers. Empiri-
cally these commission fees exhibit very little variance, both across heterogeneous
regional markets and over time. So far, there is no theoretical explanation why
such seller price setting mechanisms are used and why the linear fees vary so little.
In this paper, we first show that in a Bayesian setup seller price setting with linear
fees is revenue equivalent to the intermediary optimal direct mechanism derived
by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) if and only if the seller’s cost is drawn from
a generalized power distribution. Whenever such a mechanism is optimal, the fee
structure is independent of the distribution from which the buyer’s valuation is
drawn. Second, we derive the intermediary optimal direct mechanism when there
are many buyers and possibly many sellers and we show that with one seller any
standard auction with linear fees and reserve price setting by the seller (which are
used e.g. by eBay) implements this mechanism if the seller’s cost is drawn from
a power distribution and if buyers’ valuations are identically distributed. Third,
we show that when the number of buyers approaches infinity while there is still
one seller, seller price setting and price setting by the intermediary are equivalent,
intermediary optimal mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
In many industries, intermediaries do not buy or sell the goods they trade but rather let
the seller set the price and commission a flat percentage fee levied on this price when
the object is sold. Examples of industries where such “fee setting mechanisms” are used
include real estate brokers, retailers, and art galleries. Empirical research documents the
widespread use and the remarkably small variance of percentage fees in real estate broker-
age both over time and across different regional markets.1 Both facts – their linear struc-
ture and their small variance – are considered puzzling (see e.g. Hsieh and Moretti, 2003;
Levitt and Syverson, 2005). Despite the widespread use and the economic significance
of fee setting mechanisms2 and despite the recent upsurge of interest in intermediation,
there exists essentially no theoretical literature on whether and when these mechanisms
(with or without linear fees) are desirable from the perspective of the intermediary.3
In this paper, we make a first step towards a better understanding of these mech-
anisms, thereby providing at least a partial solution to what is perceived as puzzling.
We assume a Bayesian setup with a monopolistic profit maximizing intermediary design-
ing an exchange mechanism for one buyer and one seller, both having private information
about their valuation for the good. This allows us to build on Myerson and Satterthwaite’s
(1983) results on direct mechanisms that are optimal for the intermediary and to obtain
the following. First, we characterize the general mechanism with seller price setting that
is optimal for the intermediary. Second, we derive a necessary and sufficient condition on
the distribution of the seller’s valuation for seller price setting with linear fees to be opti-
mal for the intermediary. Third, whenever seller price setting with linear fees is optimal,
the optimal fee is independent of the distribution of the buyer’s valuation. Fourth, under
only slightly more restrictive assumptions about the inverse hazard rates, we show that
1See e.g. Hsieh and Moretti (2003), Levitt and Syverson (2005), Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas
(2005) and Hendel, Nevo, and Ortala-Magné (2007).
2In 2005 real estate brokerage commissions in the U.S. exceeded $60 billion (DOJ, 2007).
3For the theoretical literature, see e.g. Spulber (1999), Rust and Hall (2003), Caillaud and Jullien
(2003) and Rochet and Tirole (2006). The fact that (to the best of our knowledge) no name for this type
of mechanism exists only goes to show how little theoretical interest these mechanisms have received.
Two papers that provide explanations of when intermediaries may use percentage fees and when they
set prices are Hagiu (2006) and Yavas (1992). Hagiu’s argument relies on the presence and nature of
network externalities, while Yavas’ explanation depends on the presence and working of search markets.
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setting an ask and a bid price is never optimal for the intermediary.4 Fifth, we extend
the setup to many buyers and possibly many sellers and we characterize the intermediary
optimal direct mechanism. For the case with one seller we show that an auction with lin-
ear fees and reserve price setting by the seller (which are used e.g. by eBay) implements
this mechanism if the seller’s valuation is drawn from a power distribution and if buyers’
valuations are identically distributed. Last, when the number of buyers approaches in-
finity while there is still one seller, seller price setting with fees and bid-ask-price setting
by the intermediary are equivalent, intermediary optimal mechanisms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out the setup. In
Section 3, we derive the main results. Section 4 discusses price setting by the intermedi-
ary and intermediary optimal mechanisms with many buyers and sellers, and Section 5
concludes.
2 Setup
There is one seller who owns one indivisible good of known quality and one buyer who
may want to buy it. The buyer has private information about his valuation of the good
v which is drawn from the distribution F with strictly positive density f on the support
[v, v̄]. For brevity, we refer to the seller’s valuation of the good, or his opportunity cost
of selling the good, as his cost.5 The seller has private information about his cost c,
which is drawn from G with strictly positive g on [c, c̄]. Let us further define the buyer’s
virtual valuation function Φ(v) := v− (1−F (v))/f(v) and by analogy the seller’s virtual
cost function Γ(c) := c+G(c)/g(c). Throughout we make the standard assumption that
Φ and Γ are increasing.
The seller and the buyer can only trade through a monopolistic intermediary who
has all the bargaining power and can hence choose the trade mechanism. F and G are
4This stands in contrast to the standard double marginalization result which says that letting both
the upstream monopolist (seller) and the downstream monopolist (intermediary) set a mark-up is always
less efficient than letting one entity set all prices (ask and bid price setting in our case). Our results
hinge on the private information of the seller about his own valuation for the good (or equivalently, his
production costs).
5This makes clear that the model also applies to settings where the good has to be produced by the
seller at a cost.
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common knowledge. All agents are risk neutral, the buyer’s utility is v−p and the seller’s
p − c in case of trade at price p.
We focus on mechanisms that maximize the intermediary’s expected profits, and
for brevity we call such mechanisms intermediary optimal mechanisms. This allows us
to use the results of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983, Section 5, Theorems 3 and 4)
on intermediation.6 For the sake of expositional clarity, we recapitulate the results of
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) that are relevant to our analysis:
Lemma 1. An incentive compatible, interim individually rational mechanism is inter-
mediary optimal if and only if it has the following properties:
(i) the good is transferred iff Φ(v) ≥ Γ(c),
(ii) the seller with the highest cost c̄ and the buyer with the lowest valuation v both have
zero expected utility.
We will present a generalization of this result to multiple buyers and sellers in
Lemma 2 below.
3 Optimality of Fee Setting Mechanisms
We confine our attention to indirect mechanisms with the properties that the seller sets
the price, the intermediary charges a fee that only depends on the price set by the seller,
and the buyer can only decide to reject or accept the price offered. We call mechanisms
with these properties “fee setting mechanisms”.
Denote the price at which the good is offered to the buyer as P (c), the payment
received by the seller as κ(P (c)) where κ is the “net price function” and P (c)− κ(P (c))
the fee charged by the intermediary. For simplicity, we maintain the following assumption
throughout the rest of the paper:
Assumption 1. Φ(v̄) ≤ Γ(c̄) and Φ(v) ≤ Γ(c).
6Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) are almost exclusively cited for their impossibility results. A
notable exception is Spulber (1999, Ch.7). However, he merely compares the optimal direct mechanism
of Myerson and Satterthwaite with price setting by the intermediary, which is never intermediary optimal
for a finite number of buyers, as shown in Proposition 4 below.
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This assumption ensures that a mechanism satisfying (i) of Lemma 1 also satisfies (ii).
Dropping this assumption would make the equations unnecessarily complicated without
adding any substantial insights.7
We first describe the general optimal fee setting mechanism in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. The following fee setting mechanism is intermediary optimal in the
class of all incentive compatible, interim individually rational mechanisms. The seller
with cost c sets the price P (c), where
P (c) = Φ−1(Γ(c)) (1)
for c ∈ [c, Γ−1(v̄)] and an arbitrary price no less than v̄ else. Upon successful sale, the
seller gets κ(P (c)), where
κ(P (c)) = c +
∫ P−1(v̄)
c
1 − F (P (t))
1 − F (P (c))
dt (2)
for P (c) ≤ v̄ ⇔ c ≤ P−1(v̄) and κ arbitrary for P (c) > v̄.
Proof. Note that an indirect mechanism that lets the seller set the price corresponds
to a direct mechanism with the properties that there are no payments if the good is
not exchanged and payments in case of exchange can only be conditioned on the seller’s
report but not on the buyer’s. Therefore, by the revelation principle we can focus our
attention to direct mechanisms with these properties. Denote the probability that the
good is exchanged depending on reported cost c and reported valuation v as Q(c, v).
For the class of mechanisms we consider it is clearly a weakly dominant strategy for the
buyer to accept whenever the price is less than or equal to his valuation. Therefore,
the seller’s expected probability of exchange is q(c) := Ev[Q(c, v)] = 1 − F (P (c)) and
consequently, trade occurs iff the buyer accepts the offer, i.e. iff v ≥ P (c). Combining
this with the optimality condition (i) of Lemma 1 and the monotone increasingness of
Φ, we get that for an optimal mechanism trade occurs iff Φ(v) ≥ Φ(P (c)) = Γ(c). This
gives us (1). Because of Assumption 1 property (i) of Lemma 1 implies (ii).
7Φ(v) > Γ(c) is not difficult to accommodate for. A seller would never set a price less than v and
therefore (ii) holds. For Φ(v̄) > Γ(c̄) the intermediary should be able to solve the problem by imposing
a price cap: the seller is not allowed to set a price satisfying Φ(p) > Γ(c̄). Therefore, the highest cost
seller would get zero profits.
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Denote a truthfully reporting seller’s utility as U(c) := (κ(P (c))−c)q(c). By standard
arguments (see e.g. the argument leading up to equation (4) in the proof of Theorem 1
in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983)) incentive compatibility implies
U(c) = U(c̄) +
∫ c̄
c
q(t)dt. (3)
We already know that the highest cost seller is not going to sell and hence U(c̄) = 0. This
is also true for other sellers with sufficiently high cost, namely P (c) ≥ v̄ or c ≥ P−1(v̄) :=
Γ−1(Φ(v̄)). Therefore, the upper limit of the integral can be written as P−1(v̄). Equating
(3) with U(c) = (κ(P (c)) − c)q(c) from its definition and rearranging yields
κ(P (c)) = c +
∫ P−1(v̄)
c
q(t)
q(c)
dt, (4)
which is equivalent to (2).
Proposition 1 means that optimality can be achieved even if one does not use infor-
mation about the buyer’s valuation when determining payments in case of trade. Next,
we show that setting linear fees is optimal for the intermediary if and only if the seller’s
cost is drawn from a generalized power distribution. In this case the parameters of the
linear fee are fully determined by the distribution of c.
Proposition 2. The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) linear fee setting is intermediary optimal, i.e. the net price function can be written
as
κ(p) = µp + λ, (5)
(ii) the seller’s cost is drawn from a generalized power distribution G of the form
G(c) =
(
c − c
c̄ − c
)β
with β > 0, (6)
where µ = β/(β + 1) and λ = c/(1 + β).
Proof. By the same standard arguments leading to (3) we also get U ′(c) = −q(c) almost
everywhere because of incentive compatibility. Equating this with the derivative obtained
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from the definition U ′(c) = [(κ(P (c)) − c)q(c)]′ and rearranging yields
Φ(P (c)) = P (c) −
κ(P (c)) − c
κ′(P (c))
. (7)
(i) implies (ii) Take κ(p) = µp+λ. Then the right hand side of (7) becomes (c−λ)/µ.
Equating this with Γ(c) in order to achieve optimality according to Lemma 1 (i) gives
the differential equation g(c) = G(c)µ/((1 − µ)c − λ). With the condition G(c) = 0 one
obtains (6) with β = µ/(1 − µ) and c = λ/(1 − µ). The upper bound of the support c̄
remains arbitrary.
(ii) implies (i) Observe that with the distribution G specified in (6) one has Γ−1(p) =
µ̃p + λ̃ with µ̃ := β/(β + 1) and λ̃ := c/(β + 1) and, therefore, P−1(p) = Γ−1(Φ(p)) =
µ̃Φ(p) + λ̃. Take (7) and replace P (c) with p, c with P−1(p), and Φ by its definition.
Rearranging leads to
(1 − F (p))(κ′(p) − µ̃) − f(p)(κ(p) − (µ̃p + λ̃)) = 0. (8)
Defining w(p) := κ(p)− (µ̃p+ λ̃) equation (8) leads to [w(p)(1−F (p))]′ = 0. From (2) it
follows that κ(p) is not singular at p = v̄ (actually κ(v̄) = P−1(v̄)). Since 1 − F (v̄) = 0
it follows that w(p) ≡ 0, i.e. (5) is satisfied with µ = µ̃ and λ = λ̃.
As the parameters of an optimal linear fee are fully determined by the distribution
of the seller’s cost G, Corollary 1 follows directly from Proposition 2.
Corollary 1 (Invariance of Linear Fees). If a linear fee is intermediary optimal for some
distributions (G, F ), then it will also be optimal for (G, F̃ ), where F̃ is an arbitrary
distribution with an increasing virtual valuation Φ̃.
It can also be shown that the reverse implication – in some sense – of Corollary 1
also holds.
Proposition 3. If a fee κ(p) is optimal for a given G and for arbitrary F , then the fee
has to be linear and G has to be a generalized power distribution.
Proof. The optimality condition (i) of Lemma 1 implies Φ(P (c)) = Γ(c). If we want
optimality to hold for arbitrary distributions F , and hence for arbitrary functions P (c),
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equating the right hand side of (7) and Γ(c) yields Γ(c) = p−(κ(p)−c)/κ′(p) for arbitrary
p. This differential equation in κ has the solution
κ(p) = µ(p − Γ(c)) + c (9)
defined up to a constant µ. If we want this to hold for any c we need c − µΓ(c) = λ for
some constant λ, and hence Γ(c) = (c − λ)/µ. Substituting this back to (9) results in
κ(p) = µp + λ, i.e. a linear fee. This also implies a generalized power distribution G by
Proposition 2.
As optimality of linear fees implies invariance of the fees with respect to the buyer’s
distribution, the empirical prediction of Proposition 2 is that whenever profit maximizing
intermediaries choose linear fee setting as a mechanism, these fees will be invariant.
Clearly, this prediction is consistent with available empirical evidence.
Note also that the upper part of the seller’s cost distribution [P−1(v̄), c̄], i.e. those
sellers who for sure cannot sell, is irrelevant for the intermediation problem at hand.
Therefore, Proposition 2 means that a linear fee only implies a generalized power dis-
tribution in the relevant range [c, P−1(v̄)]. Above this range, G can have any shape,
provided its virtual cost function is increasing. Corollary 1 and the empirical prediction
thus hold not only when the cost distribution is the same over time and across regions,
but even if it has only the same shape in the relevant range.
The following interpretation can be given for the different percentage fees observed
in different industries. A percentage fee punishes the seller for raising the price (i.e.
reporting a higher cost in the corresponding direct mechanism described in Proposition 1)
and serves therefore as an incentive for truthful reporting. A low percentage fee implies
a high parameter β of the cost distribution, less uncertainty about the seller’s cost, and
hence less need to incentivize him. Thus a real estate agent – charging a fee of 6% – can
be interpreted as having less uncertainty about the seller’s own valuation for his house
than an auctioneer such as Sotheby’s – charging around 20% – about the seller’s own
valuation for say a painting.8
8The analogy between the seller setting the transaction price in case of one buyer and the seller
setting the reserve price of an auction in case of many buyers is shown in subsection 4.2.
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To illustrate our results, let G(c) = cβ for c ∈ [0, 1] with β > 0 and let F be an
arbitrary distribution with support [0, 1] and increasing Φ, and assume κ(p) = µp. Then
the expected profit of the seller with cost c when setting price p is (µp − c)(1 − F (p))
and the maximizer is given by the first order condition Φ(p(c, µ)) = c/µ. Hence, the
intermediary’s expected profit when using a linear fee setting mechanism with κ(p) = µp
is
∫ µ
0
(1−µ)P (c, µ)(1−F (P (c, µ)))g(c)dc, where the upper limit of the integral stems from
the fact that a seller with c > µ can never sell profitably. Observing that P (c, µ) = P (t)
with t = c/µ and substituting variables, this expected profit is equal to
∫ 1
0
(1−µ)P (t)(1−
F (P (t)))g(µt)µdt = µβ(1−µ)
∫ 1
0
P (t)(1−F (P (t)))βtβ−1dt, where the integral is positive
and independent of µ and the equality follows because g(µt) = β(µt)β−1. Thus, the
optimal µ is µ = 1/(1 + β) ⇔ β = µ/(1 + µ). For β equal to one, G is a uniform
distribution and the optimal fee is p − κ(p) = p/2. If F is uniform on [0, 1] as well, the
seller with cost c sets the price P (c) = 1/2 + c and the intermediary’s expected profit
is 1/2
∫ 1/2
0
(1/2 + c)(1/2 − c)dc = 1/24. This is, of course, the same as in the example
provided after Theorem 4 in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).9
It is worth mentioning that analogous results can be obtained for mechanisms where
the buyer sets the price and the fee is conditioned on this price. It is for instance optimal
for the intermediary to let the buyer set the price and charge a linear fee κB(p) − p =
(µB − 1)p + λB if and only if the buyer’s valuation is distributed with F (v) = 1 − [(v −
v)/(v̄ − v)]βB with µB = −βB/(1 + βB) and λB = v̄/(1 + βB).
4 Extensions
4.1 Intermediary Price Setting
Consider now an alternative mechanism, called price setting, which is widely used e.g. by
stock market and used car dealers: the intermediary sets an ask (or buyer) price pB and
9Observe the following analogy. The double auction described by Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983)
satisfies the social optimality condition stated in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983, Theorem 2) for
uniform F and G. The fee setting mechanism described here satisfies the intermediary optimality
conditions for a power distribution G and arbitrary F . Observe further that it can never be so-
cially optimal to let the seller (or the buyer) set the price, as can be shown easily with Theorem 2
in Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
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a bid (or seller) price pS; if both seller and buyer are willing to trade at these prices, then
the intermediary earns the bid-ask spread. Otherwise, there is no trade. The following
proposition characterizes the optimal bid and ask price and shows that under fairly weak
assumptions price setting is never optimal for the intermediary.
Proposition 4. Assume the following about the inverse hazard rates of the distributions:
(1 − F (v))/f(v) is decreasing and G(c)/g(c) is increasing. Then the optimal ask price
pB and bid price pS are given by the equations pB = Γ(pS) and pS = Φ(pB). Further,
intermediary price setting is never optimal for the intermediary.
Proof. The intermediary’s expected profit with price setting is (pB−pS)(1−F (pB))G(pS).
The assumptions about the inverse hazard rates ensure concavity of the profit function.
Therefore, the unique maximum is given by the first order conditions. Taking derivatives
with respect to pB and pS yields pS = Φ(pB) and pB = Γ(pS). We complete the proof
by showing that trade with price setting neither implies nor is implied by trade in the
Myerson-Satterthwaite mechanism for arbitrary distributions F and G.
Trade with intermediary price setting, no trade with the Myerson-Satterthwaite op-
timal mechanism. Take a buyer and a seller for whom trade just occurs with price
setting, i.e. valuation pB and cost pS. We know that a profit maximizing intermedi-
ary will always set pB > pS. Combining this with the first order conditions we get
Φ(pB) = pS < pB = Γ(pS). This implies by Lemma 1 (i) that no trade occurs with the
optimal mechanism for valuation pB and cost pS.
Trade with the Myerson-Satterthwaite optimal mechanism, no trade with intermediary
price setting. Take the lowest cost seller with cost c and a buyer with valuation v′ such
that trade just occurs with the optimal mechanism, i.e. Φ(v′) = Γ(c). As pS > c must
hold for positive probabilities of trade with price setting, we have Φ(v′) = Γ(c) = c <
pS = Φ(pB). This implies v′ < pB and hence no trade with price setting.
Proposition 4 implies that for generalized power distributions of the seller’s cost, fee
setting with a linear fee is strictly better for the intermediary than price setting.10 This
10Actually, if we allow for arbitrary fee functions, fee setting is strictly better than price setting for
arbitrary G.
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result hinges on the assumption that the intermediary does not know the seller’s cost c.
If the intermediary knows c because, say, the intermediary owns the good (i.e. the seller
and the intermediary are a vertically integrated firm), then price setting will be optimal
for the intermediary.11 Not surprisingly, the profit of the vertically integrated seller-
intermediary will exceed the joint profits of the stand alone seller and stand alone inter-
mediary. This is broadly consistent with the empirical findings of Levitt and Syverson
(2005) and Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005), who show that houses owned by real
estate brokers are sold more profitably than houses where the intermediary is not the
owner.
However, because the fee setting mechanism that is optimal for the non-integrated
intermediary imposes an upward distortion in the seller’s effective cost, the price set
by the non-integrated seller should be larger than the ask price pB set by the inte-
grated intermediary-seller. Accordingly, the welfare of the buyer with an integrated
intermediary-seller should be larger than when the seller and the intermediary are in-
dependent. The prediction of lower prices under vertical integration contrasts with the
empirical findings of Levitt and Syverson (2005) and Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas
(2005) and reinforces their argument that there is an additional agency problem in real
estate brokerage.
4.2 Many Buyers
Our results easily generalize to setups with more than one buyer if we restrict ourselves to
a certain class of mechanisms. Define “non-discriminating mechanisms” as mechanisms
that cannot distinguish between buyers. Note that both fee setting and price setting as
described above fall in this category. An intermediary restricted to non-discriminating
mechanisms basically treats all buyers as one “representative buyer” whose valuation is
drawn from a distribution F , F being the distribution of the highest order statistic of the
buyers.12 In such a setup all of our results hold. This implies in particular that whenever
11If the intermediary and the seller are independent agents, then pS = c and the seller’s profit is zero.
Whether the intermediary and the seller are vertically integrated or not, the optimal ask price will be
pB = Φ−1(c). That price setting is optimal with one buyer follows from the theory of optimal selling
mechanisms; see e.g. Myerson (1981).
12One can interpret F (p) as the probability that no buyer is willing to buy at price p.
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linear fees are an optimal non-discriminating mechanism, they are independent of the
distributions of the buyers’ valuations and, therefore, also of the number of buyers.
However, we can say more than that for intermediary optimal mechanisms with many
buyers. The first result relates to optimal mechanisms when there are finitely many
buyers and one seller. As a preliminary, we first derive the intermediary optimal mech-
anism with many buyers and possibly many sellers. Since this is a generalization of
the Myerson-Satterthwaite results on intermediary optimal mechanisms summarized in
Lemma 1 above, it is of some interest on its own.13
Let NB and NS, respectively, be the number of buyers and sellers, whose valuations
vb and costs cs are independent draws from the distribution Fb with density fb and
support [vb, vb] and the distribution Gs with density gs and support [cs, cs]. As before,
we assume that the virtual valuations Φb(vb) and the virtual costs Γs(cs) are strictly
increasing and we use b (s) exclusively to indicate a buyer (seller). Order and relabel
the realized virtual valuations in decreasing and virtual costs in increasing order, i.e.
Φ1 > Φ2 > .. > ΦNB and Γ1 < Γ2 < .. < ΓNS . Let K be the integer such that
ΦK ≥ ΓK and ΦK+1 < ΓK+1 provided such a K < min{NB, NS} exists. Otherwise,
let K = min{NB, NS}. This quantity is naturally called Quasi-Walrasian and we call
an allocation rule Quasi-Walrasian if all buyers and sellers with b, s ≤ K trade and all
others do not.
Lemma 2. The intermediary optimal mechanism that respects individual rationality and
incentive compatibility of buyers and sellers has a Quasi-Walrasian allocation rule and
gives zero expected utility to buyers with vb = vb and sellers with cs = cs.
The proof is in the appendix. For NB = NS = 1 the Quasi-Walrasian allocation rule
reduces to the intermediary optimal allocation rule of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983).
With many buyers and one seller, the intermediary optimal allocation rule requires the
good to go to the buyer with the largest virtual valuation, provided this virtual valuation
exceeds the seller’s virtual cost.
We now assume that there is one seller (i.e. NS = 1) and that the NB > 1 buyers’
13See also Baliga and Vohra (2003).
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valuations are independently drawn from the identical distribution F with support [0,1].
Proposition 5. If the seller’s cost c is drawn from the distribution G(c) = cβ for c ∈
[0, 1], then any standard auction with a reserve price and a linear fee κ(p) = pβ/(β + 1)
levied on the final sale price p is an intermediary optimal mechanism.
Proof. We first prove the statement for a second price auction and then invoke the payoff
equivalence theorem (see e.g. Myerson, 1981, Lemma 3) to prove it for arbitrary standard
auctions. So consider a second price auction where the seller faces a fee κ(p) = (1− µ)p
and has cost c and sets a reserve price r. This seller’s expected profit is
(1 − µ)NB
{
r(1 − F (r))F (r)NB−1 +
∫ 1
r
y(1 − F (y))(NB − 1)F (y)
NB−2f(y)dy
}
+ cF (r)NB ,
which follows from Krishna (2002, p.25) by multiplying the brackets with (1 − µ) and
adding the expected value cF (r)NB of not selling the good. Note that the good is sold
to the buyer with the largest virtual valuation, provided this is larger than the reserve
r. The optimal reserve price r(c, µ) satisfies Φ(r(c, µ)) = c/(1 − µ). Observe that the
effective cost c/(1 − µ) on the right hand side becomes equal to Γ(c) = c(β + 1)/β by
choosing 1/(1 − µ) = (β + 1)/β. Thus, the mechanism implements the intermediary
optimal allocation rule if c is drawn from a power distribution. The proof is completed
for the second price auction by observing that a buyer with vb = 0 and a seller with
c = 1 both net zero expected profits.
It follows from Lemma 3 in Myerson (1981) that all standard auction formats will
have the same expected revenue and indeed the same reserve price.14 This completes the
proof.
The second result concerns the equivalence between, and optimality of, price setting
by the intermediary and linear fee setting when the number of buyers NB approaches
infinity while the number of sellers NS is kept fixed at one. For simplicity, assume that
buyers’ valuations are identically and, as before, independently distributed according to
the distribution F on [v, v]. The seller’s cost is distributed according to G on [c, c] with
14See also Milgrom (2004, Ch.3) and Jehle and Reny (1999, Th.9.9 and Ex.9.20).
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c < v and as in Proposition 4, we assume that G(c)/g(c) is increasing. Moreover, as in
the rest of the paper, we assume that F and G satisfy Assumption 1.
Proposition 6. As NB approaches infinity, intermediary price setting and fee setting
are equivalent. Moreover, if F has an increasing virtual valuation, both mechanisms are
intermediary optimal.
Proof. Observe that with NB → ∞ the optimal (ask) price, be it set by a seller or
the intermediary, is v. Therefore, a price setting intermediary’s maximization problem
reduces to the choice of pS such that (v − pS)G(pS) is maximized, the unique solution
to which is v− pS∗∞ = G(p
S∗
∞ )/g(p
S∗
∞ ), where uniqueness follows from the assumption that
G/g is increasing. Observe that another way of expressing pS∗∞ is p
S∗
∞ = Γ
−1(v). On the
other hand, when using fee setting, the fee κ(p) is just the constant κ(v) because all types
of sellers who sell set the price equal to v. Thus, under fee setting, the intermediary’s
problem is to choose a constant κ(v) that maximizes (v − κ(v))G(κ(v)), whose solution
κ∗∞ is, obviously identical to p
S∗
∞ .
To see that the second phrase is true, observe that for NB > 1 and NS = 1 the
intermediary’s expected profit under the optimal mechanism (derived in the proof of
Lemma 2) can be written as
∫
X\s
∫ Γ−1(max{maxb[Φ(vb)],c})
c
{
max
b
Φ(vb) − Γ(c)
}
g(c)dcf(v)dv,
where X denotes the product set containing all (v, c) and X \ s denotes the product set
containing all valuations v. As NB approaches infinity, maxb{Φ(vb)} = Φ(v) = v with
probability one. Therefore, the intermediary’s expected profit becomes
∫ Γ−1(v)
c
[v − Γ(c)]g(c)dc = vG(Γ−1(v)) −
∫ Γ−1(v)
c
Γ(c)g(c)dc.
Notice that
∫ Γ−1(v)
c
Γ(c)g(c)dc =
∫ Γ−1(v)
c
[cg(c)+G(c)]dc, which after integrating by parts
becomes Γ−1(v)G(Γ−1(v)). Therefore, the intermediary’s expected profit when using the
optimal direct mechanism is [v−Γ−1(v)]G(Γ−1(v)), which is the same as the profit when
the intermediary sets either prices or fees. This completes the proof.
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Note that for an infinite number of buyers and fee setting any κ satisfying κ(v̄) =
Γ−1(v̄) and incentive compatibility is profit maximizing for the intermediary. For instance
the intermediary could just as well charge a fixed fee v̄ − Γ−1(v̄).
5 Conclusions
The widespread use of linear fee setting mechanisms is empirically well documented and
so is the fact that these fees exhibit very little variance across different regional markets
(Hsieh and Moretti, 2003; Hendel, Nevo, and Ortala-Magné, 2007). In the present pa-
per, we have shown that linear fee setting is optimal for the intermediary, i.e. satisfies
the intermediary optimality conditions of Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), if and only
if the seller’s cost is drawn from a generalized power distribution. Whenever such a
mechanism is optimal, the fee structure is also independent of the distribution of buy-
ers’ valuations. Moreover, we have generalized the intermediary optimal mechanism of
Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) to a setup with many buyers and possibly many sell-
ers. We have further shown that any standard auction format with a reserve price set
by the seller and a linear fee is intermediary optimal if the seller’s cost is drawn from a
power distribution under the assumption that the buyers’ valuations are identically and
independently distributed.
While focussing on direct mechanisms is, of course, extremely fruitful for theoretical
research, it renders difficult recognizing when and where such direct mechanisms are
used in practice. Further research on real world mechanisms is likely to uncover other
instances of applications of well-known direct mechanisms.
Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. A direct mechanism asks buyers and sellers to report their valuations and costs.
Denoting by (v, c) a collection of such reports with v = (v1, .., vNB) and c = (c1, .., cNS),
the direct mechanism is then characterized by the probability Qb(v, c) that b gets a
unit of the good and Qs(c, v) that s produces a unit of the good for b = 1, .., NB and
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s = 1, .., NS and by the payments Mb(v, c) it asks from buyers and the payments Ms(c, v)
it makes to sellers. Clearly, a mechanism is only feasible if for all (v, c),
∑NB
b=1 Qb(v, c) ≤
∑NS
s=1 Qs(c, v). Let Q be the collection of these probabilities. We refer to Q as the
allocation rule of the mechanism.
We only sketch the proof, a fully detailed version of which is available upon request.
Lengthy, though completely standard arguments (see e.g. Krishna, 2002) can be applied
to show that a revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem holds. Formally, mb(vb) =
mb(vb) + qb(vb)vb −
∫ vb
v
b
qb(t)dt and ms(cs) = ms(cs) + qs(cs)cs −
∫ c̄s
cs
qs(t)dt for all c, v,
lower case functions standing for expectations about all others’ valuations and costs (e.g.
mb(vb) := Ev
−b,c[Mb(v, c)]). Again, by standard arguments, this implies E[mb(vb)] =
mb(vb) + E[Φb(vb)qb(vb)] and E[ms(cs)] = ms(c̄s) + E[Γs(cs)qs(cs)]. A profit maximizing
intermediary will make the individual rationality constraint just binding, therefore, his
expected profit
∑NB
b=1 E[mb(vb)] −
∑NS
s=1 E[ms(cs)] is
∫
X
{
NB
∑
b=1
Φb(vb)Qb(v, c) −
NS
∑
s=1
Γs(cs)Qs(c, v)
}
f(v)g(c)dvdc, (10)
where f(v) and g(c) are the joint densities of all buyers and sellers, respectively, and X
is the product set containing all (v, c). Inspection of the term in curly brackets reveals
that the profit can be maximized point by point by implementing the Quasi-Walrasian
allocation for each realization (v, c).
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